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Peter Spiegler examines the current state of theoretical and empirical 
modelling in economics. According to him, this involves answering two 
questions: First, how can one determine what causal factors are 
essential for a phenomenon and, second, how does one ensure that the 
methodological tools employed represent these features faithfully (p. 9)? 
Spiegler puts forward new answers to these questions. He argues that a 
look behind mathematical models in economics is necessary: these 
methods are themselves not capable of showing that the economic 
phenomena and their representations within formal models are 
compatible, in the sense that the formal models conceptualise their 
domain of applicability accurately for a given epistemic purpose. He 
suggests that this compatibility between formal methods and economic 
phenomena needs to be checked with the help of an interpretative-
hermeneutic method, akin to techniques used in anthropology and 
sociology, and that this should give rise to a new subfield of economics: 
interpretative economics. 
Economists and philosophers of economics alike might be puzzled 
by this suggestion of giving qualitative methods such a key role within 
economics. I think both should be stimulated by Spiegler’s proposal. 
Throughout the book, it becomes evident that he is a philosophically 
highly informed economist who identifies relevant issues in a precise 
manner and skilfully navigates through the nitty gritty details of 
particular episodes of economic modelling. Even if one leaves aside his 
call for a substantial reform of economics, this book contains a lot of 
food for thought. For example, his discussion of the New, New 
Institutional Economics and Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) modelling provides rich case studies that put on the radar of 
philosophers of economics subfields of the discipline that have so far 
not received enough attention. 
BEHIND THE MODEL / BOOK REVIEW 
ERASMUS JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 125 
Spiegler’s two specific claims are the following: Blind spots are a 
problem for all formal methods in economics and there needs to be an 
interpretative-hermeneutic method to assess the aptness of these formal 
techniques. I am intrigued by these two claims but not convinced by 
them. My worry is that Spiegler does not do enough to support them. 
Before spelling this out, let me briefly summarise the three parts of the 
book. 
In part I, Spiegler introduces a pragmatic account of formal 
modelling and puts forward a criticism of theoretical and empirical 
formal modelling that sets the stage for the rest of the book. He 
suggests the following framework that is inspired by Mäki (2009): An 
epistemic agent S uses a model M to represent X for purpose P. The 
success of S in accomplishing P is judged against disciplinary norms N 
(p. 25). He further differentiates between four stages of formal 
theoretical modelling: In the delimitation phase, a social phenomenon is 
delimited and a research question is formulated in ordinary language 
(e.g., why is there involuntary unemployment?). In the denotation phase, 
the delimited social phenomenon is connected to a mathematical model 
in two steps: first, the formal structure of the model is described 
informally—with the help of ordinary language names for the 
phenomenon (yielding what he calls a proto-model); second, the model 
is presented in purely formal terms. In the solution phase, purely 
mathematical operations are performed to arrive at a result. In the 
interpretation phase, the solution stated in mathematical terms gets re-
translated into ordinary language using the correspondence established 
in the denotation phase (pp. 46-52). According to Spiegler, the same four 
phases can be used to describe econometric modelling. In this case, 
however, two additional relations need to be accounted for: 1) 
econometric models are (sometimes) models of an economic theory and 
2) econometric data is data about economic phenomena (p. 73). 
Crucial for understanding Spiegler’s criticism of formal economic 
modelling is his view of models as metaphors. Metaphors invite us “to 
project the attributes of mathematical objects onto […] social entities: to 
‘see’ social phenomena through the overlay of mathematical relations” 
(p. 53). Following Hesse (1963), he suggests that the illumination 
provided by a metaphor requires that there is enough relevant similarity 
(positive analogy) and sufficiently little relevant dissimilarity (negative 
analogy), such that one can see the neutral analogies (i.e., the ways in 
which the two entities related in a metaphor may possibly be similar) as 
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relevant similarities (p. 54). He helpfully clarifies this requirement 
further by introducing the “no essential negative analogies” (NENA) 
condition (p. 58). What the NENA condition requires is that the 
dissimilarities between a formal model and its target do not pertain to 
the essential properties of the target. Essential properties are defined 
with respect to the purpose of the modelling exercise (p. 56). Put 
differently, the model should not “distort or obscure […] the target 
subject matter” but rather should be apt for the target system in light of 
an epistemic purpose (p. 58). This prompts the crucial question for 
Spiegler: What properties does a given social phenomenon need to have 
to be compatible with a formal construct introduced in the denotation 
phase of formal modelling? According to Spiegler, formal modelling 
presupposes that “(1) the objects under study are plausibly stable, 
modular and quantitative, with no qualitative differences among 
instantiations of each type; and that (2) the relations between these 
objects are plausibly fixed and law-like throughout the context of the 
study in the modelling exercise” (p. 63). He illustrates these two 
conditions with the help of Shapiro and Stiglitz’s (1984) efficiency wage 
theory. According to this theory, it can be beneficial for managers to pay 
more than the market clearing wage since it undermines the incentive 
for workers to shirk because there is a credible threat of being 
unemployed. For Spiegler, the concept of effort as represented in this 
theory (i.e., a continuous variable that does not allow for qualitative 
distinctions among its instantiations) violates condition 1) as it does 
not, for example, account for relevant qualitative distinctions between 
effort types such as effort in an assembly line vs. effort in an 
advertising firm (p. 64). The theory also violates condition 2), since the 
proposed stable relation between wage level and effort of employees is 
depending on the connotation that a wage regime has in a company and 
this effect cannot be a priori known and, crucially, not be assumed to 
establish a fixed relation between wage and effort level (p. 65). Hence, 
Shapiro and Stiglitz’s efficiency wage theory lacks essential 
compatibility with its intended target domain and, hence, should be 
viewed as a problematic formal modelling exercise. Spiegler closes part I 
by arguing that an exactly parallel condition to the NENA condition 
holds for econometric modelling: successful econometric modelling 
presupposes that there is a homorphism between data and social 
phenomena (p. 77). 
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In part II, Spiegler applies the essential compatibility requirement 
between models and their target domain to two case studies: New, New 
Institutional Economics and DSGE modelling. In the interest of brevity, I 
focus on the latter. He argues DSGE models had failed in the run-up to 
the recent financial crisis since their formal structures precluded seeing 
the crisis’ relevant dynamics. In other words, DSGE models have 
significant blind spots since they do not meet the essential compatibility 
requirement. In particular, the assumptions that aggregate 
macroeconomic behaviour can be represented as optimizing behaviour 
of a representative agent, that financial markets are efficient, and that 
the macroeconomy is a log linear system represent essential features of 
macroeconomic phenomena incoherently as they rule out chaotic 
dynamics (pp. 120-125). 
In part III, Spiegler puts forward his constructive proposal against 
the background of the criticisms in the first two parts of the book. He 
suggests founding a new discipline within economics: interpretative 
economics. The role of this discipline is to provide the relevant 
information for checking whether the methodological tools of 
economists are essentially compatible with their intended domain of 
application. This new field should establish the meaning of economic 
concepts (such as effort or wage) and assess whether these concepts 
display the stability requirements set out in the NENA condition, and, 
hence are susceptible to formal modelling (p. 166). He suggests an 
interpretative-hermeneutic method to accomplish these tasks. This 
method involves three related steps: 1) choosing a fore-understanding of 
the phenomenon to be analysed, 2) refining this fore-understanding 
through a contact with the phenomenon that is open-ended enough to 
“allow the phenomena to speak for themselves” (p. 172), and 3) 
interpreting the phenomena of interest utilising the information in 1) 
and 2) (p. 172).  
Spiegler discusses Bewley’s (1999) work on wage rigidity during 
recessions as an exemplar of this new field of economics. Bewley, 
frustrated by empirical and theoretical limitations of available accounts 
of wage rigidity (e.g., Shapiro-Stiglitz’s efficiency wage theory), engaged 
in a set of unstructured interviews, inspired by interpretative survey 
techniques in sociology and anthropology, with businesspeople 
responsible for hiring and compensation decisions. He found, among 
other things, that these businesspeople are focussing on the morale of 
the work force and that the mechanism of the efficiency wage theory 
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qua punishing mechanism undercuts this morale significantly. This is 
evidence for Spiegler’s claim that Shapiro and Stiglitz’ theory violates 
the NENA condition (pp. 176-181). Importantly, Spiegler believes that a 
hermeneutic-interpretive method, and hence a non-formal method, is 
necessary to retrieve the information about the essential compatibility 
between models and target systems (pp. 146-148). 
I think Spiegler’s emphasis of potential blind spots of formal 
modelling techniques and his attempt to come up with a constructive 
proposal to determine the extent of the respective blind spots of various 
formal techniques should be highly welcomed. However, in my view, 
there is a central ambiguity running through this book that makes it 
hard to pin down exactly what Spiegler’s main line of criticism against 
formal economic modelling is. Because of this ambiguity and the 
dialectical space it opens up, I do not see why the interpretative-
hermeneutic method should be the way forward to address the 
shortcomings of formal modelling techniques. 
Spiegler’s comments about the essential compatibility of formal 
models with economic phenomena can be read in two ways. One can 
read it in the strong sense that formal models in economics are bound 
to fail since economic phenomena do not exhibit the required modularity 
and stability described in the NENA condition in virtue of some fact 
about economic reality. This reading is supported by Spiegler’s claim 
that the “potential hazards of model-target mismatch are endemic to all 
mathematical economic modelling” (p. 191), his characterisation of the 
meaning of social phenomena as “fluid, evolving, and imprecise” which 
are “formed dialectically—i.e., by agents acting within norms and 
conventions which are in turn shaped by these individual actions” (p. 
146), and his remarks about how formal models of New, New 
Institutional Economics “render institutions susceptible to economic 
analysis by converting them into something else” (p. 96). Alternatively, 
one can read Spiegler’s claim in the weak sense that formal models in 
economics might fail since economic phenomena might not exhibit the 
required modularity and stability described in the NENA condition. The 
clearest indication that Spiegler might have this interpretation in mind 
is contained in a footnote on Lawson’s realism (see, e.g., Lawson 1997). 
Spiegler claims in this passage that there is a central difference between 
the NENA condition and Lawson’s conditions for the aptness of formal 
modelling of economic phenomena: “A central difference between 
[Lawson’s] conditions and [my conditions] is that Lawson’s conditions 
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are pitched at the level of ontology—whereas [my conditions] deal with 
the plausibility of claims and therefore are essentially pragmatic 
conditions” (p. 63, fn. 17). 
I think that both readings of the claim face some argumentative 
challenges. Consider the strong reading to start. To make a case for a 
general inaptness of formal methods to model the economic realm 
requires taking a stance regarding the ontology of the economic realm. 
In fact, one needs to defend a substantial (social) ontology which rules 
out characterisations of economic entities and relations that could be—
in principle or in relation to the epistemic purposes of modelling—
formally modelled. Coming up with such an ontology and some sort of 
epistemic access conditions to establish that the ontology is in fact an 
accurate description of the economic realm is a daunting task. Taking 
Spiegler’s remarks about Lawson’s realism seriously, a charitable 
interpretation suggests that he never actually had the strong, more 
radical claim in mind, while discussing the limits of formal modelling. 
However, I do think there are some gaps in the defence of the weak 
claim as well. 
Spiegler (p. 121) states explicitly that the NENA condition should be 
read as not only involving the dyadic relationship between models and 
targets but also the purposes and norms of the modelling exercise. So, 
showing that a formal economic technique is inapt for modelling a 
domain requires showing that the technique is inapt in relation to a 
particular epistemic purpose. The case studies that Spiegler provides 
reveal that some modelling techniques are inapt in relation to some 
epistemic purposes such as the explanation of the phenomenon of wage 
rigidity. However, I do think that his discussion overlooks two important 
aspects of the model-purpose link. 
First, a formal modelling technique might be apt given one changes 
the epistemic purpose. To put it differently, a domain of investigation 
might be satisfying the NENA condition given one changes the epistemic 
purpose. Let me illustrate this with one of Spiegler’s own papers. 
Together with Stephen Marglin, he analysed the effectiveness of the 
fiscal stimulus in the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) (Marglin and Spiegler 2014). With the help of surveys—an 
interpretative technique—they established that the counterfactual claim 
that states would have been able to spend at the observed levels in the 
absence of ARRA was false. Spiegler (pp. 187-188) rightly concludes that 
this piece of information invalidates the use of an econometric model by 
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Cogan and Taylor (2012) aiming at measuring the stimulus impact which 
is built on this false assumption. However, what it fails to show is that 
for a different epistemic aim, Cogan and Taylor’s (2012) formal model 
would be inapt. It might be apt, for example, for revealing one relevant 
causal factor in the causal-nexus of the stimulus impact, i.e., 
consumption smoothing considerations by states. Importantly, as 
Spiegler (p. 187) himself notes, the surveys of Marglin and Spiegler 
(2014) do support assumptions regarding consumption smoothing on 
state level. Moving away from Marglin and Spiegler (2014), some 
theoretical models might not be apt for the analysis of policy-
intervention, however, they can be fruitfully used to study the working 
of isolated causal mechanisms in the economy (see, for example, the 
Caballero et al. 2015 model that introduces a mechanism for re-
balancing asset markets in an economy that is at the zero-lower bound 
of the interest rate). I do think that shifts of epistemic aims can be 
pursued across different theoretical and empirical modelling exercises. 
The underlying reason for this is that for different epistemic aims, 
distinct aspects of a model could be representationally relevant. Now, if 
for a given epistemic purpose some aspects of a model are not 
representationally relevant, then these aspects cannot ground a 
violation of the essential compatibility requirement between a model 
and a target. For example, if one claims that a formal model provides a 
causal-mechanistic explanation of an economic phenomena, more 
elements of the model must be viewed as representationally relevant 
than in the situation where a model is used for short-term forecasting 
with the option for daily feedbacks of prediction errors into the model 
(for example a vector-auto-regression model). If one disagrees with this 
possibility of formal models being apt (or inapt) depending on the 
epistemic purpose pursued, I think, one is committed to the strong 
reading of Spiegler’s claim and, hence, faces the challenge that was 
mentioned above. 
Second, some of the methods that Spiegler discusses might be apt 
for the epistemic purposes that he evaluates them on, despite his claim 
to the contrary. His discussion of state of the art DSGE models is a case 
in point. Spiegler claims that this modelling framework is inapt for 
assessing real world macroeconomic phenomena since it cannot display 
non-linear dynamics (pp. 120-125). However, it should be noted that the 
standard DSGE framework with rational expectations does not preclude 
markets from collapsing and allows for multiple equilibria outcomes 
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(see, e.g., Den Haan 2003; 2007). Again, the key question seems to be 
what epistemic aim should be realised with a particular model. 
If these aspects are relevant for state of the art economic modelling, 
then I do not see the urge to have a special discipline within economics 
assessing the aptness of formal modelling techniques. An alternative 
upshot of Spiegler’s analysis—following from the weak claim—could be 
to demand from economists to state more precisely what the epistemic 
purpose of their formal modelling endeavours are. Note that this point 
is independent of additional reservations one might have against the 
reliability of interpretative-hermeneutic methods (and in particular 
against their empirical tools of interpretative interviews and participant 
studies). 
Spiegler’s book is an economically extremely well-informed 
engagement with the foundations of formal modelling. Even if one 
shares my reservations regarding his reform proposal for the discipline, 
this book provides plenty of fruitful case studies and frameworks that 
certainly advance our understanding of the economic practice. 
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